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Global Constitutionalism and the Responsibility to 
Protect 
 
Abstract 
 
There is recent scholarship suggesting that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has now 
emerged as a master concept in relation to responding to mass atrocity crimes and that the 
R2P can further be seen as representative of an emerging global constitutional norm. In 
critical response, this article provides the first attempt to systematically investigate Z ?W ?Ɛ
relationship with global constitutionalization as well as to explore its wider implication with 
regards to global constitutionalism. In doing so, the article examines existing discussions of 
R2P and global constitutionalism, tracks the normative evolution of R2P in order to 
determine ŝƚƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ‘ƐƚĂŐĞ ?ŽĨnorm diffusion, and further attempts to locate the extent to 
which the R2P can be perceived as also part of a process of global constitutionalization. From 
this analysis the article concludes that although the R2P could be labelled as, at best, a weak 
emerging norm, it fails to meet the more demanding signifier of an emerging constitutional 
norm and that there is further evidence to suggest that the R2P might be better understood 
as a stalled or degenerating norm. 
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Introduction 
There is a considerable amount of scholarship suggesting that the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) represents an answer to the failures of prior humanitarian intervention norms.
1
 As is 
often argued, the architects of the R2P aspired to provide a resolution to two debates 
                                                          
1
 G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institute, 
Washington DC,  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ŽƚƚĞǇ ?  ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ /ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ P dŚĞ EĞǁ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ WĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?Contemporary Politics  ? ? ? ? d ƵŶŶĞ ?  ‘Z ?W P ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ƵƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ŽƐƚƐ ?
(2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 443; M Doyle, The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the 
Responsibility to Protect (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2015). 
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permeating the humanitarian intervention lexicon: To redefine sovereignty as responsibility 
and to change the discourse on intervention by substituting the contested concept of Ă ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ
ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ Ă more normative demand for a  ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞ ? ?2 As an 
example ŽĨ Z ?W ?Ɛperceived impact, Thakur and Weiss have suggested that the R2P 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƵƌƚŝŵĞ, ?ǁŝth Gilbert further claiming that it 
ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŽƐƚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƚŽ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ǇĞĂƌs ? ?3 In making similar 
claims, many scholars of International Relations have argued that the R2P better satisfies the 
moral imperatives underwriting the need for the international community to act in the face 
of humanitarian crises.
4
 
As part of this R2P discourse many have argued that  ‘the R2P has snowballed to the point 
that it has become Ă “ŵĂƐƚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? in relation to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing ?.5 Bellamy further agrees that the 
R2P has become firmly entrenched, ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŶŽǁ ĂƌĞ ŽŶĞƐ ĂďŽƵƚ
ŚŽǁďĞƐƚ ƚŽ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚZ ?W ?ŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?6 In this way, it is 
claimed that the R2P has surpassed its norm predecessor humanitarian intervention in terms 
of both normative advancement and influence. As part of these arguments, considerable 
effort has been made to provide conceptual clarity to the R2P, its implication on global 
order, as well as highlight its significance in international law. These efforts have been 
deemed necessary because it is generally recognized that conceptual distinctions and clarity 
are of fundamental importance to the R2P discourse, since ƉŝŶŶŝŶŐĚŽǁŶZ ?W ?Ɛ ‘ŶŽƌŵ status ?
is indispensable for determining the extent to which the R2P can influence state policy and 
                                                          
2
 J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) 2. 
3
 ZdŚĂŬƵƌĂŶĚdtĞŝƐƐ ? ‘Z ?W P&ƌŽŵ/ĚĞĂƚŽEŽƌŵ W ĂŶĚĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Responsibility to Protect 23; M 
Gilbert ? ‘dŚĞdĞƌƌŝďůĞ ? ?th ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'ůŽďĂůĂŶĚDĂŝů ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? Also see >ǆǁŽƌƚŚǇĂŶĚZŽĐŬ ? ‘Z ?W P
EĞǁĂŶĚhŶĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚŐĞŶĚĂ ? ? ?009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 69. 
4
 As a sample see F dĞƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĂƐĞĨŽƌ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŝn J Holzgrefe and R Keohane (ed) 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003); H Andrew, Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003); N 
tŚĞĞůĞƌ ? ‘sŝĐƚŽƌǇĨŽƌŽŵŵŽŶ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?dŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝů ƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?tŽƌůĚ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2 J Intl L & Intl Relations 95; K Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005); 
G Evens, see (n 1); J Pattison, James, see (n 2); A Linklater, The problem of harm in world politics: Theoretical 
investigations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011); T Dunne, see (n 1); M Doyle, see (n 1); L 
Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞůůĂŵǇ ? ‘dŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚdƵƌŶƐdĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ethics and International Affairs 161. 
5
 A Gallagher, Genocide and its Threat to Contemporary International Order (Palgrave Macmillan, Basignstoke, 
2013) 125. 
6
 A Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: A defense (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 12. 
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practice, whether it can transform the dominant understanding of sovereignty, whether it 
can overcome the failures of past humanitarian intervention norms, and whether it has the 
potential to become part of customary international law.  
Nevertheless, conceptual clarity and the diffused impact of the R2P on creating international 
legal norms remain difficult to pin down. ^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ǁĂƐ
coined in 2001 by the International Commission for State Sovereignty and Intervention 
(ICISS), it ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚƵďďĞĚĂƐĂ  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ?7 a  ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?8  ‘ĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚŶŽƌŵ ? ?9 Ă  ‘ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ
ŶŽƌŵ ? ?10 ĂŶ  ‘ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ŶŽƌŵ ? ?11 Ă  ‘ŶĞǁ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŶŽƌŵ ?,12 aŶ  ‘ĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŶŽƌŵ ? ?13  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ůĂǁ ? ?14 ĂŶ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ŶŽƌŵ ? ?15 a  ‘ŶĞǁ ŶŽƌŵ ƚŽ ůĞŐĂůŝǌĞ
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?16  ‘ŽŶ ŝƚƐ ǁĂǇ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ Ă ŶĞǁ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇůĂǁ ?17 and even as having  ‘ĂƚƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ?18
Relatedly, those who remain sceptical have unfavourably depicted the R2P as simply  ‘ŽůĚ
wine in new bottles ?,19  ‘ŵƵĐŚĂĚŽĂďŽƵƚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?,20  ‘ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?,21 and recently, in 
                                                          
7
 EC Luck,  ‘A Response ? ? ? ? ? ? ?2 Global Responsibility to Protect 178 W183. 
8
 AJ Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
9
 d ƵŶŶĞ ĂŶĚ < 'ĞůďĞƌ ?  ‘ƌŐƵŝŶŐ DĂƚƚĞƌƐ P dŚĞ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞĐƚ ĂŶĚ >ǇďŝĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?6 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 329. 
Ǉ ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚ ŶŽƌŵ ? ƵŶŶĞ ĂŶĚ 'ĞůďĞƌ Ăŝŵ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ Z ?W  ‘ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ĐůĂƐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞ ƚŽ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ŵŽƌĂů ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞZ ?W ? ? 
10
 J Brunnée and SJ Toope, Legality and Legitimacy in International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2010) 324. 
11
 United Nations, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,  ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, ? A/59/565 (2 December 2004). 
12
 G Evans,  ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come ... and Gone? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? International 
Relations 286. 
13
 E^ŚĂǁŬŝ ? ‘ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ PdŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůEŽƌŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Responsibility to 
Protect 173. 
14
 :DtĞůƐŚĂŶĚDĂŶĚĂ ? ‘International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States' 
Responsibilities? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Responsibility to Protect 213 W231. 
15
 :D tĞůƐŚ ?  ‘EŽƌŵ ŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞĐƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?Global Responsibility to Protect 
387. 
16
 ^:^ƚĞĚŵĂŶ ? ‘hEdƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂŶƌĂŽĨ^ŽĨƚĂůĂŶĐĐŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Affairs 938. 
17
 See (n 6); L Arbour,  ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice' (2008) 34 
Review of International Studies 447 W8. ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ dŚŽŵĂƐ tĞŝƐƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ Z ?W  ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƐ ĂƐ
ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ ůĂǁ ? ? ^ĞĞ d' tĞŝƐƐ ?  ‘Z ?W ĂĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 743. 
18
 R Vanlandingham ? ‘Politics or Law? The Dual Nature of the Responsibility to Protect ? (2012) 41 Denver Journal 
of International Law & Policy 120. 
19
 ^ƚĂŚŶ ? ‘ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ PWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůZŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽƌŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ>ĞŐĂůEŽƌŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?American Journal 
of International Law 102. 
20
 T Reinold ?  ‘The responsibility to protect  W much ado about nothing? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? Review of International 
Studies 55 W78. 
21
 T Ekiyor and D K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?  ‘dŚĞ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞĐƚ  ?Z ?W ? P  ǁĂǇ ĨŽƌ ĂƌĚ  W or rather part of the 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Foreign Voices 1-8. 
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the aftermath of the international community ?Ɛ ŝĚůĞŶĞƐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ǇƌŝĂŶĐƌŝƐis, as 
 ‘ĚĞĂĚ ?.22  
In the context of  ‘Őlobal constitutionalism ?, yet another description has been attached to the 
 ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ? EĂŵĞůǇ ?its description as an  ‘ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ global constitutional 
norm ?.23 Although this additional understanding of the R2P is intriguing, labelling the R2P as 
part of an emerging global constitutionalism requires better justification, especially since, 
despite its far-reaching implications, attempts to understand R2P as a part of the process of 
global constitutionalism are scarce. Furthermore, when such explorations have been made 
in the past, they are far from systematic, comprehensive, or convincing. As a result, there is 
considerable room for scepticism about labelling the R2P as an emerging global 
constitutional norm and such a claim requires significant investigation before those of us 
more sympathetic to global constitutionalism should be overly enthusiastic.  
With this in mind the purpose of this article is to provide the first attempt at systematically 
investigating Z ?W ?Ɛ relationship with global constitutionalization as well as exploring its wider 
implication with regards to global constitutionalism. The overarching question we wish to 
explore is to what extent the R2P can be perceived as an emerging constitutional norm 
within larger constitutionalization processes and what does this determination tell us about 
Z ?W ?Ɛ place within broader debates concerning global constitutionalism?  
In response to this question the article progresses in four sections. Section One draws upon 
existing discussions of R2P and global constitutionalism to highlight existing lacunas as well 
as to provide some contextual background for analysis. Section Two examines the normative 
evolution of R2P and determines its current  ‘stage ? of norm diffusion, suggesting that the 
R2P should be considered, at best, a  ‘weak emerging norm ? and that it features what Welsh 
describes as ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŶŽƌŵ ?. 'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
R2P as detailed in Section Two, Section Three seeks to locate the extent to which the R2P 
can be further perceived as part of a process of constitutionalization, arguing that there are 
ǀĂƌǇŝŶŐ ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘Ĩŝƚ ? between the R2P and global constitutionalism, but that this  ‘Ĩŝƚ ?
                                                          
22
 See M Nuruzzaman ?  ‘dŚĞ  “ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Insight Turkey 57 W66. 
^ĞĞĂůƐŽ:ĞůůĂŵǇ ? ‘Z ?W PĞĂĚŽƌůŝǀĞ ? ?ŝŶM Brosig (ed), The Responsibility to Protect  ? From to Evasive to 
Reluctant Action: The Role of Global Middle Powers (HSF, ISS, KAS & SAIIA, Johannesburg, 2012). 
23
 WĞƚĞƌƐ ?  ‘DĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ:<ůĂďďĞƌƐ ?WĞƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ'hůĨƐƚĞŝŶ  ?ĞĚ ? ?
The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 189. 
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depends on how we wish to understand global constitutionalism writ large. From these 
determinations, the conclusion establishes whether the R2P lends itself to a global 
constitutionalism reading or whether the R2P norm suffers potential degeneration and 
stalled constitutionalization, which has so far received limited critical attention, but which 
also greatly threateŶƐ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇto be understood as part of a larger global 
constitutional interpretation. The article concludes that although the R2P might reasonably 
be labelled as a weak emerging norm in terms of basic norm diffusion models, it fails to meet 
the more demanding signifiers of an emerging constitutional norm and that there is further 
evidence to suggest that the R2P might be better understood as having the hallmarks of 
what might be labelled as a stalled or degenerating norm. 
Nevertheless, before beginning it is important to set and justify the parameters limiting the 
scope of this article. First, this article remains focused on testing the relationship between 
the R2P and its saliency as a foundational component of global constitutionalism. The reason 
for this tight ĨŽĐƵƐ ŝƐ ƚǁŽĨŽůĚ P  ? ? ƚŚĞ Z ?W ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ŝŵƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞĂ  ‘ŐĂŵĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƌ ?within 
contemporary international relations and that it therefore has constitutional significance, 
whether as a piece of international customary law
24
 or as a  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝǌŝŶŐ ?norm which 
significantly alters the way we think about international relations and the responsibilities of 
the  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?25; 2) Yet the explicit and implicit references to the R2P as a 
potential ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ  ‘ŐůŽďĂů ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ŶŽƌŵ ? ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽƚ ďĞĞŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ Žƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚ
thoroughly, suggesting that these intimations either represent an underdeveloped 
assumption ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ?Ɛ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ŶŽƌŵ status and/or symbolizes a level of wishful 
thinking by global constitutionalists (and R2P scholars) who want to locate increasing 
political and legal order amongst continuing international contestation. Second, and 
ƌĞůĂƚĞĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇƉƵƚƚŚĞZ ?W ‘ŶŽƌŵƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŽ
bed, that is an investigation beyond the limits of any one article. The aim here is merely to 
suggest that remaining questions about the norm status of the R2P render it untenable as an 
emerging global constitutional norm. In this way, the argument is not to suggest that the 
Z ?W ŚĂƐŶ ?ƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ǁĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŶŽǁ or in the 
future, but to simply suggest that the more generous treatments of the R2P as part and 
parcel of increasing constitutionalization and global constitutionalism should be, at present, 
                                                          
24
 RJ Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart Publishing, London, 2013). 
25
 See (n 1 & n 4). 
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tempered. Third, by providing a more critical and thoroughgoing treatment of the R2P the 
article aims to provide additional criteria from which to better pinpoint investigations into 
the potential of the R2P and what iterations, reforms and institutionalizations will be 
required before it could be more confidently understood as representative of an emerging 
constitutional norm. Fourth, it should be noted that this article makes no moral or ethical 
judgement about the R2P, its relationship with humanitarian military intervention (which is a 
considerable aspect of Pillar III of the R2P), or about the merits / effectiveness / 
imperialism(s) involved with humanitarian intervention in its various forms.
26
 In addition, we 
recognize that the R2P is not limited to humanitarian intervention in its militarized sense, 
since prevention and post-conflict commitments are present within the R2P lexicon 
(although they remain wanting). In this way the aim here is merely to test the R2P as a norm 
that challenges certain existing political and legal orthodoxies, which in turn may or may not 
epitomize a set of global constitutional properties. Lastly, due to space limitations, we 
recognize that other related and relevant R2P literatures will at times be under-represented 
or receive tailored treatment. Nevertheless, we also think that the arguments presented 
here are germane and critically applicable to many optimistic accounts of the R2P, which 
continue to portray the R2P as being  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƵƌƚŝŵĞ ? and thus 
normatively and legally constitutive of a new era in international politics.
27
 As suggested 
above, this article will examine and question these more optimistic accounts of the R2P so as 
to better determine its constitutional significance. 
I. Constitutionalization and the R2P as an Emerging Global Constitutional Norm 
The inaugural editorial to the journal Global Constitutionalism states that the debates 
surrounding the R2P, especially following the manifestation of the norm in Libya, have given 
ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ of issues 
emerging beyond the state. ?28 The editors underscored the need for serious multidisciplinary 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ  ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŝŶŐ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŶŽƌŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ŚĞůĚ ĂƐ
                                                          
26
 For a good critical overview see A Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2012). 
27
 See (n 1, 4, 5, 6 & 24). 
28
 A Wiener, AF Lang Jr, J dƵůůǇ ?DWDĂĚƵƌŽĂŶĚD<Ƶŵŵ ? ‘'ůŽďĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ P,ƵŵĂŶRights, Democracy 
and the Rule of LĂǁ ? (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 2. 
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ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŝŶ ŵŽƐƚ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĞ ? ?29 
Nevertheless, despite the explicit identification of R2P as resting importantly within the 
global constitutionalism discourse, the norm has actually received very little attention in the 
relevant literature, with the only explicit attempt to locate the R2P within the global 
constitutionalism paradigm offered briefly by Peters.
30
 
For Peters, the key to identifying Z ?W ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽprocesses of global 
constitutionalization resides with how global constitutionalism understands sovereignty as 
 ‘ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĂƐƚĂƚĞĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ[and thus subordinate to] (and not only protected) by 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ?31 ƐWĞƚĞƌƐĂƐƐĞƌƚƐ ? ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂlists welcome the re-characterisation of 
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ĂƐ ŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐ Ă ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ: 1) similarly to the 
constitutionalist perspective postulating that the ultimate normative source of international 
ůĂǁŝƐ ? Q ?ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ŶŽƚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ? ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĨZ ?W ƚĂŬĞƐŚƵŵĂŶŶeeds as the starting 
point and 2) shifts the focus from state right to state obligations (or responsibilities), which is 
ĂƚǇƉŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? ?32 To establish the relationship between the responsibility 
to protect and global constitutionalism, Peters underscores the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) acknowledgement of the concept of sovereignty 
ĂƐĞŶƚĂŝůŝŶŐĂ ‘ĚƵĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ PĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ W to respect the sovereignty of other states, and 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŽƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂŶĚďĂƐŝĐƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨĂůůƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
concomitant dual accountability that flows from it  W ƚŽĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŽŶ ƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?
and to the broader community of states on the other hand.
33
  
                                                          
29
 Ibid. 
30
 See (n 23). Although there are a significant number of scholars who have in different forms implied that the 
R2P represents a political and/or legal norm that alters the constitutional makeup of international relations 
(see n 1, 3, 4, 6 & 24), we have chosen to largely focus on Peters account for the following reasons. First, Peters 
ŝƐ Ă ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌ ŽĨ ŐůŽďĂů ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƵƐĞĨƵů ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ?Ɛ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
constitutionalization and does so in more detail than most International Relations scholars. Second, there has 
ďĞĞŶǀĞƌǇ ůŝƚƚůĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽŶƚŚĞZ ?WĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ůŝŶŬƚŽŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚƵƐŵĂŬŝŶŐWĞƚĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƌĞ
expansive account particularly useful in terms of setting the debate. Although reference is made to other R2P 
authors who broadly intersect with aspects of ŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?WĞƚĞƌƐ ?treatment is favored, due to its 
direct engagement with the focus of this article. 
31
  &ĂƐƐďĞŶĚĞƌ ?  ‘^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů >Ăǁ ? ŝŶ E tĂůŬĞƌ  ?ĞĚ ? ?Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 129. Under this understanding, the establishment and entrenchment 
of the international prohibition on the use of military force can be properly appreciated as a (re)legalization of 
sovereignty and as a crucial step towards the constitutionalization of the international legal system. 
32
 See (n 23) 155, 185.  
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ĂƐWĞƚĞƌƐƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞŝƐĂĐŽƌŶĞƌƐƚŽŶĞ
of the current transformation of international law into a constŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?^ĞĞ ?Ŷ ? ?) 190. 
33
 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001) paras 1.35, 2.15. 
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In unpacking key elements of the R2P doctrine Peters identifies four concepts, borrowed 
from the constitutionalist arsenal, which she suggests provide the missing links within the 
logic of the ICISS. First, global constitutionalism provides a concept of international 
community and the related constitutionalist argument for the existence of international 
legal obligations that may fall upon and be owed to the broader community of states.
34
 
Second, the concept of multi-level governance, or the idea that governance activities are 
flexibly distributed to different levels (i.e. local, national, regional, supra-national, global) 
offers an explanation as to why the responsibility to protect would logically fall to the 
international level in cases of failure at the lower domestic level.
35
  Third, the existence of an 
internal responsibility of states towards its citizens can be explained through the 
constitutional idea of a social contract, according to which agents invest their state with 
sovereign powers in exchange for the protection of their rights, denoting that these powers 
can be revoked should the sovereign fail to fulfil its intrinsic duty to secure those rights.
36
 
The connection between the internal and external responsibility can also be conceived of as 
a vertical social contract between the broader community of states and the state, by which 
ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ŝƐ ďŽƵŶĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ Ă ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ƐŽ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ŝƚ meets its 
fundamental commitment (or responsibility) to protect its populations.
37
   
The connection between internal and external responsibility is reflected in the three pillar 
structure of the R2P, where Pillar I, based on pre-existing legal obligations, is the 
responsibility of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, crimes against humanity; Pillar II addresses the duty of the international 
community to assist states in building the requisite capacities to fulfil their responsibility to 
protect populations from the four crimes, and; Pillar III is the ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
responsibility to act in a timely and decisive manner should states fail to discharge their 
primary responsibility.
38
 By virtue of its three-pillar structure, Welsh refers to the R2P as a 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŶŽƌŵ ? ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝptions that not only impose different obligations 
                                                          
34
 See (n 23) 187; For a detailed account of the emergence of the international community see (n 24) 31, 61. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. For instance, Peters associates the internal responsibility with Lockean liberal constitutionalism, with 
the only difference being that states have a responsibility to protect all individuals within their territory, 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ƚŚŝƐĚƵƚǇ ŝƐŽǁĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛcitizens.; See also 
Buchan (n 24) 185 W6. 
37
 Ibid (n 23) 187. 
38
 hŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ?ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞhE^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-General, Ban Ki-
moon, A/63/677 (12 January 2009) 2, 8-10. 
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on different actors, but are characterized by varying degrees of specificity.
39
 In this sense, 
Bellamy argues that the Z ?WŝƐ ‘ŶŽƚĂƐŝŶŐůĞŶŽƌŵďƵƚĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚǁŽ
sets of norms  W one set concerned with how governments treat their own population and 
the other set concerned with how the international community as a whole should respond 
ƚŽ ŵĂƐƐ ĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?40 Whereas the former responsibility for states to protect their 
populations from mass atrocity crimes is a highly determinate norm entrenched in 
international human rights and humanitarian law,
41
 the exact requirements that Pillar II and 
III impose on the international community are less specific, which in turn weakens their 
compliance pull and uptake.
42
 The lack of definitional clarity surrounding the requirements 
of Pillars II and III and their context-dependency give rise to heated scholarly debates as to 
whether these elements of the R2P can be characterized as norms.
43
 Hence, this article will 
focus on the most indeterminate and contentious aspect of the R2P  W the third pillar. 
>ĂƐƚůǇ ?WĞƚĞƌƐƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ůĞŐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? as strengthening the case 
for a duty to provide humanitarian assistance beyond borders, and as yet another 
 ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ if a state 
fails in its own obligation.
44
  
What becomes clear from Peters ? discussion is that she relies on two conceptual functions 
common to global constitutionalism. The first relates to the concept of constitutionalization 
as a descriptive method to explain legal phenomena relating to notions of international 
community, where the R2P is framed as an emerging norm of customary international law. 
This usage of global constitutionalization is fitting with global constitutionalism writ large, 
since theories of constitutionalization are used to describe underlying legal or political 
processes of law creation at the global level, which are then interpreted as representative of 
a larger regime structure with constitution-like qualities.
45
 Like Peters ? usage in relation to 
                                                          
39
 See (n 15) 384, 386-387. 
40
 See (n 6) 62. 
41
 Luke Glanville goes further to suggest that the idea of sovereignty has always included a corresponding 
responsibility to protect its own citizens as a condition of that sovereignty and therefore the R2P does nothing 
more than to explicitly articulate a notion that has always been coupled with legitimate sovereignty from its 
inception by Bodin and Hobbes. See L Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014).    
42
 See (n 6) 63.  
43
 See (n 15) 387. 
44
 See (n 23) 187. 
45
 'tƌŽǁŶ ? ‘dŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Constitutionalism 203. 
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the R2P, the descriptive quality of constitutionalization generally takes on three basic 
characteristics: 1) The categorization of formal legal and political processes as being part of a 
ůĂƌŐĞƌǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůŽƌƉůƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ ?Őůobal legal order that generates measurable and 
demonstrable compliance pull; 2) The explaining of empirical subjectification of various 
entities into an established overarching legal order and / or the legal codification and 
clarification of jurisdictional relationships and obligations between entities, and; 3) 
Descriptions of extra-legal processes of norm solidification and socialisation that represent 
international community building in a meaningful sense.
46
  
The second function employed by Peters refers to normative constitutionalism as a heuristic 
device  W a normative guideline for reading international law and moving the agenda for a 
more constitutionalized world order forward. In relation to the latter, Peters perceives the 
R2P as a constitutional concept in the sense that it espouses key normative tenets and thus 
challenges the saliency of state sovereignty by suggesting that in cases where laws 
protecting sovereignty and human rights clash, the latter trump the former by virtue of 
being more important in terms of normative substance. This again fits with the global 
constitutionalism approach writ large, where it is often claimed to represent  ‘Ă ƐƚƌĂŶĚ ŽĨ
thought (an outlook or perspective) and a political agenda which advocates the application 
of constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights 
protection, and democracy, in the international legal sphere in order to improve the 
effectivity and the fairness of the international legal order ?.47  
Although WĞƚĞƌƐ ?use of the global constitutionalist approach does help to frame the R2P 
phenomena as a challenge to existing international norms, the claims that the R2P is also a 
corresponding  ‘emerging global constitutional norm ? that has the potential to crystalize into 
 ‘hard international law ?48 requires further investigation and justification. In other words, 
WĞƚĞƌƐ ? ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞ ƚŚĞ Z ?W Ăs a constitutional norm lacks the requisite 
specificity and depth to adequately gauge if it can be properly conceived as a process of 
global constitutionalization. Although Peters vaguely identifies some ways in which R2P can 
                                                          
46
 Ibid 205, 206, 208. 
47
 WĞƚĞƌƐ ? ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms 
and Structures ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?Leiden Journal of International Law 583. Klabbers et al. further characterize 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂƐĂŶ ‘ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ?ĂĨƌĂŵĞŽĨŵŝŶĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?^ĞĞ:<ůĂďďĞƌƐ ?WĞƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ'hůĨƐƚĞŝŶ ?
The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 10. 
48
 See (n 23) 188. 
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be perceived as resonating with processes of global constitutionalization, these conclusions 
are undermined by a tendency ƚŽ ŽǀĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
constitutional potential. The reason for this is that she seemingly conflates the idea of R2P 
with the norm of R2P. The main concern here is that her analysis relies solely on the original 
propositions of the ICISS report, which formed the basis of the R2P idea. However, as will be 
discussed later, the Commission ?s proposals have been considerably watered down by the 
time of their adoption by the General Assembly in 2005, which arguably sheds important 
light on the level to which the R2P has / has not developed as an emerging constitutional 
norm.  In addition, there have been a number of reiterations within the R2P discourse that 
suggest that there are ebbs and tides, contestations, reformulations and rejections within 
international discussions. In this regard, the lack of a precise conceptual distinction between 
the R2P as normative idea under debate (what Bellamy claims as a meta-theoretical 
agreement regarding basic principles) and the R2P as a diffusing norm (on-going 
contestation regarding significance and application)
49
 ultimately results in an overstatement 
ŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ as an emerging constitutional foundation. 
II. Better Understanding the Norm Status of the R2P 
The key concern above relates to how far the R2P, as articulated in the ICISS report and 
beyond, has moved toward solidifying into an international norm.
50
 The analysis presented 
here will embody a much-needed reappraisal of the R2P as an emerging norm, tracing out 
recent R2P-related developments in international relations. In doing so, this section will first 
offer a brief chronological ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ƐƚĞƉƐ ŝŶ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ? ŝƚ ǁŝůů ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ Z ?W ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ďǇ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ĨĂƌĞ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞ ĂŶĚ ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ?Ɛ ƚŚƌĞĞ-stage norm  ‘ůŝĨĞ-ĐǇĐůĞ ? ŵŽĚĞůas well as Risse and 
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 ^ĞĞĞůůĂŵǇ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĞ ?Ŷ ? ? ? 
50
 /Ŷ ŝƚƐ ŵŽƐƚ ďĂƐŝĐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? Ă ŶŽƌŵ ŝƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ  ‘ĂƐ Ă ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĨŽƌĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŝƚŚĂŐŝǀĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?ƐĞĞD&ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ<^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůEŽƌŵǇŶĂŵŝĐƐĂŶĚ
WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Organization 891. An important conceptual distinction underscored in 
ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŽŶ ŶŽƌŵƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŶŽƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚ ŝĚĞĂƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƵŶůŝŬĞ ŶŽƌŵƐ  ? ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ĨŽƌ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ Ă ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ŵĞƌĞůǇ
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ  ‘ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƌŝŐŚƚ ĂŶĚ ǁƌŽŶŐ ŚĞůĚ ďǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ? ƐĞĞ Z :ĞƉƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?  tĞŶĚƚ ĂŶĚ W: <ĂƚǌĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?
 ‘EŽƌŵƐ ? /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƵůƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ W ? : ? <ĂƚǌĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ  ?ĞĚ ? ?The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics  ?ŽůƵŵďŝĂ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ ? EĞǁ zŽƌŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? /Ŷ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ “ŽƵŐŚƚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ŝƐǁŚĂƚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐŶŽƌŵƐĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƌƵůĞƐ ?ƐĞĞ&ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞ
and Sikkink (above) 891) and makes the study of the process through which ideas evolve into norms 
worthwhile.  
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^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ?Ɛ ‘ƐƉŝƌĂů ?ŵŽdel of norm socialisation.51 The rationale behind choosing these models 
is that they provide an outline of the criteria that can help pinpoint R2P ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?
including threshold criterion which can help demark a line between an emergent norm and 
an accepted international norm.
52
 
This more systematic eǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚive advancement is important, since 
locating the norm status of the R2P is a prerequisite for determining its potential to 
influence public policy, determining its solidification into binding law, to guide discourse, to 
alter state practice, to affect the protection of suffering populations and, most importantly, 
to determine whether the R2P has any true transformative constitutional potential. By 
better determining the norm status of the R2P, we provide analysis on the R2P that can 
locate foundations for our ensuing discussion of R2P ?Ɛ relationship with constitutionalization 
and its potential stagnation or degeneration. 
II.A The Z ?W ?ƐEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ Trajectory 
In December 2001 the ICISS reframed the humanitarian intervention debate as a 
responsibility to protect in response to the pressing need to forge a new shared 
understanding for addressing grave human rights violations.
53
 hŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ 
understanding, sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their populations from 
                                                          
51
 Norm socialization is commonly conceptualized as the process by which principled ideas held by individuals 
become norms that can then influence a transformation of interests, identities and behaviours with the 
ultimate goal for states to internalize them, so as to guarantee compliance in the absence of external pressure, 
ƐĞĞdZŝƐƐĞĂŶĚ<^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ‘dŚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐEŽƌŵƐŝŶƚŽŽŵĞƐƚŝĐWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ŝŶd
Risse, K Sikkink and  SC Ropp (ed), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 
 ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ ? ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? KƚŚĞƌƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ƐŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŶĞǁ
members [...] into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a societǇ ? ? ƐĞĞ : ĂƌŶĞƐ ? D ĂƌƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ D
Skidmore, The World of Politics (^ƚ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ?New York, 1980) 35. What makes this definition particularly 
relevant to the discussion of the R2P is that it presupposes the existence of a society. At the global level, this 
understanding of socialization is intelligible within the confines of the international system described as a 
society of states, see H Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1977). In this sense, norm socialization is the mechanism through which states become 
recognized as members of the society of states, see Risse and Sikkink (above) 11. 
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 WŽƌƚĞůů ĂŶĚ :t ĂǀŝƐ ?  ‘,ŽǁŽ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐDĂƚƚĞƌ ? dŚĞŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ /ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚional 
ZƵůĞƐĂŶĚEŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Studies Quarterly 451-478; NG Onuf,  World of Our Making: Rules and 
Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1989); ME Keck 
and K Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1998); ƐƉŝƌĂůƐ P d ZŝƐƐĞ ?  ‘>Ğƚ ?Ɛ ƌŐƵĞ ? ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ tŽƌůĚ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?International 
Organization 1 W ? ? ? :d ŚĞĐŬĞů ?  ‘tŚǇ ŽŵƉůǇ ? ^ŽĐŝĂů >ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ŚĂŶŐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
International Organization 553 W588. 
53
 See (n 33 ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ?<ŶŶĂŶ ? ‘dǁŽŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?The Economist 49 W50. 
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ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŚĂƌŵƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?ĞƚŚŶŝĐĐůĞĂŶƐŝŶŐ ?ƐƚĂƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?54, but also that when they are 
 ‘ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŽƌƵŶĂďůĞ ?55 ƚŽĚŽƐŽ ‘ƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŵƵƐƚďĞďŽƌŶĞďǇƚŚĞbroader community 
ŽĨ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?56 In theory, the new idea resolves the sovereignty-intervention debate, for 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞ ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞ ŝƚƐ
responsibility to protect, it revokes its sovereignty and hence its corollary right to be free 
from external intervention.
57
 The report submits that the international community can 
legitimately intervene ŝŶ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ĐĂƐĞƐ ?
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ůĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞůŽƐƐŽĨůŝĨĞŽƌůĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞ ĞƚŚŶŝĐĐůĞĂŶƐŝŶŐ ? ?58 The ICISS further stipulates 
that once international responsibility is triggered, the UNSC has a residual responsibility to 
ĂĐƚŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ  ‘ĨŝƌƐƚƉŽƌƚŽĨĐĂůů ?.59 As Buchan rightly 
suggests, under tŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ, the UNSC is under a positive duty to react, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇmust be borne by the broader community 
ŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ŚŝƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ? ?60 Significantly, the Commission tentatively points to two subsidiary 
sources of legitimate authority, should the UNSC relinquish its responsibility, namely the UN 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ ŝƚƐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ƚŽĂĐƚƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘hŶŝƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌWĞĂĐĞZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
international organizations acting under Chapter VII.
61
 Lastly, the report calls on the P5 to 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ƚŽ Ă  ‘ĐŽĚĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǀĞƚŽ ŝŶ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐĂůůŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ
action to halt grave humanitarian emergencies.
62
 In this vein, the latter two proposals 
represent attempts to resolve issues of legitimate authority, by circumventing or directly 
addressing the problems stemming from the UN^ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚical make up that often stifles 
decision-making on the use of force. Yet, despite taking major steps towards overcoming the 
impasse related to humanitarian intervention, it is often argued that the ICISS report itself, 
when presented in 2001, was not much more than  ‘Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĂƐƚƵƚĞ ĂŶĚ ůĞŐĂůůǇ ĂǁĂƌĞ
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 See (n 33) para 8.1. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid VIII. 
57
 Luban describes the principle of non-ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ĞĂĐŚƐƚĂƚĞŚĂƐĂĚƵƚǇŽĨŶŽŶ-intervention into the affairs 
ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞĐŽƌŽůůĂƌǇŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?>ƵďĂŶ ? ‘:ƵƐƚtĂƌĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 164.  
58
 See (n 33) paras 4.10, 4.19 
59
 Ibid para 6.28 
60
 See (n 24) 67. 
61
 See (n 33) ƉĂƌĂƐ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?dŽůĂŹŽƐ ?  ‘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ /ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ
ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ? ŝŶ Z tŽůĨƌƵŵ ĂŶĚ  <ŽũŝŵĂ  ?ĞĚ ? ?Solidarity: A Structural 
Principle of International Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2010) 164; UN General Assembly, Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, A/RES/377 A (V) (3 November 1950). 
62
 See (n 33) XIII, 51. 
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statement by a highly distingƵŝƐŚĞĚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ does not give rise to 
corresponding binding legal and political obligations.
63
  
II.B The R2P Outcome Document 
Although the doctrine saw tense negotiations in the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, by 
the time it was unanimously endorsed by more than a 150 heads of state in the Outcome 
Summit Document, the concept had undergone dramatic alternations and had been pruned-
down to just two paragraphs.
64
 Critically, the two drastic conceptual shifts that occurred in 
the 2005 Secretary-General Report were broadly adopted by the General Assembly in 
2005.
65
 The Outcome Document solidified R2P links with international crimes by specifically 
ůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐ ĨŽƌĂůůZ ?WĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĨŽƵƌŵĂƐƐĂƚƌŽĐŝƚǇĐƌŝŵĞƐ  ‘ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?ǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?
ĞƚŚŶŝĐĐůĞĂŶƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĐƌŝŵĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?66 Once again, the report definitively affirmed 
that the subsidiary responsibility to protect lies exclusively with the UNSC.
67
 However, unlike 
the responsibility of states towards their citizens, this residual responsibility was not 
understood in the sense of a positive duty to intervene ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŝŵƉůŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ǁĞ
are prepared  ? ?ŶŽƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞŽƌŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ?ƚŽƚĂŬĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? Q ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĂĚĚĞĚ ? ?68 Furthermore, in contrast with all previous iterations of the R2P, 
the Outcome Document submitteĚƚŚĂƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞĂƌĞƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞ ‘ŽŶĂ
case-by-ĐĂƐĞďĂƐŝƐ ? Q ?ƐŚŽƵůĚƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůŵĞĂŶƐďĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
are manifestly failing ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŽƵƌŵĂƐƐĂƚƌŽĐŝƚǇĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?69    
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 W Burke-tŚŝƚĞ ? ‘ĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ ?ŝŶ:'ĞŶƐ ƌ ?/ŽƚůĞƌ ?dƵƚƵĂŶĚs,ĂǀĞ ?ĞĚ ? ?The 
Responsibility to Protect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 18. 
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 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2006) paras 138, 139. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid para 138. 
67
 Ibid para 139; See (n 19) 99 W120. 
68
 See (n 64 ?ƉĂƌĂ  ? ? ? ?ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ŝƐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞKƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŝƐ
the overlap with the position of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, asserƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘dŚĞ ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ
Security Council a wide degree of latitude do determine the most appropriate course of action. The council 
should continue to respond flexibly to the demands of protecting populations from crimes and violations 
relating to ZƚŽW ? ?ŵǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ? PhE^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ‘ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ PdŝŵĞůǇĂŶĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ
ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? ? hE ŽĐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-S/ 2012/ 5787 (25 July 2012). This position is advocated by Stahn who brings 
attention to a letter by the Secretary of State to Jon Bolton, released shortly after the Summit, elucidating that 
ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ŶŽƚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽƵŶĐŝů ? Žƌ
individual states, have an obligation to intervene under inteƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ? P YƵŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ (n 19) 108. The 
understanding that the UN merely possess a discretionary right to intervene is affirmed by Buchan, who refers 
to the Libyan crises to suggest that once the Libyan government violated its responsibility to protect, the UNSC 
did not see it as passing to itself.: See (n 24) 69. 
69
 See (n 64) para 139. 
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Although replacing the ICISS prerequisite for R2P action -  ‘ƵŶĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐ ? ǁŝƚŚ
 ‘ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?  W was an attempt to make the formulation of the concept more specific, 
the lack of definitional clarity surrounding the latter requirement posits further hurdles to 
making decisions on the use of force.
70
 In addition, as the diplomacy surrounding the 
Summit suggests, neither states, nor the Secretary-General, wanted to create additional 
legal obligations.
71
 Hence, the R2P was intentionally confined to the parameters defined by 
the extant framework on the use of force, which are bound to the principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention. This makes it perfectly clear that states want to preserve sovereign 
political discretion when it comes to matters of high-politics, in particular the use of force. 
To sum up, what emerged from the 2005 World Summit was not revolutionary with respect 
ƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ƵŶĚĞƌĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ‘ƐƚĂƚĞƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
have an obligation to: prevent and punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; assist states to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law (e.g. in 
ŽŵŵŽŶƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞǀĂ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĂŐƌĞĞ ƚŽ  “ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ĂŶĚ  “ĞŶƐƵƌĞ
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ? ?72 Furthermore, the 
2005 Outcome Document did not establish a new international authority, other than the 
UNSC, to act outside the Charter with respect to the use of force. Lastly, the Outcome 
Document remains largely a moral imperative and a political commitment intended to fortify 
existing legal commitments, as opposed to an attempt to transform international law or 
create new legal obligations.
73
 /Ŷ ĨĂĐƚ ? ĂƐ ĞůůĂŵǇ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŽŶ Z ?W ǁĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
precisely because it did not change or even seek to change the basic international rules 
governing the use of force ? ?74 particularly because a number of states were opposed to its 
ĐƌǇƐƚĂůůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŽ Ă ŶĞǁ ůĞŐĂů ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
responsibility to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes.
75
 Instead, as Welsh suggests, 
ƚŚĞKƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨƐŽĨƚůĂǁ ? Q ?that helps to shape interpretation 
of existing rules by emphasizing particular normative understandings about domestic and 
                                                          
70
 The manifest state failure requirement effectively ruled out the possibility for preventative action by 
reaffirming that the UNSC can only sanction intervention to halt an enduring crisis. Unfavourably, this solidified 
Z ?W ?ƐůŝŶŬǁŝƚŚ ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚƵŵĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?^ĞĞEŚŽŵƐŬǇ ?The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Pluto 
Press, London, 1999). 
71
 See (n 15) 375. 
72
 See (n 6) 16. 
73
 See (n 6) 374. 
74
 See (n 15) 14.  
75
 See also (n 15) 375-376. 
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ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?76 By virtue of the unanimous endorsement of Articles 138 and 139, 
ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĂƐ  ‘ĂŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ ŬĞǇ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵpt to prompt 
states to act on their existing obligations to their own populations as part of international 
human rights law.
77
 In this way, it could be argued that although not a new legal device, the 
WSOD does provide greater clarity to the R2P norm by helping to diminish definitional 
confusion and facilitate states adherence by way of informing legal debate. As a result, the 
R2P has potential to inform and be referred to as a moral imperative within existing 
customary and codified international legal channels. 
Ɛ tĞůƐŚ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĚĂ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ
representative body, is a reasonable proxy for the existence of the international opinio juris 
ŽŶ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚĞƐƚŝĨŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ ƐŽŵĞ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚing on the 
R2P.
78
 Thus, despite not being legally binding, General Assembly (GA) resolutions can in this 
way generate international cooperation or articulate a level of meta-theoretical moral 
consensus.
79
 However, the significance of the former function is in some sense devalued as a 
potential component of constitutionalization by the fact that the GA decision would have 
been clearly transformative as a constitutional foundation had it coupled to the UNSC in a 
way that created an obligation to intervene.
80
 That said, despite its weak legal position, in 
2006 the R2P concept did find endorsement by the UNSC in Resolution 1674 and was 
invoked in Resolution 1706 with regards to the conflict in Darfur,
81
 which unlike the 
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 Ibid 377. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 See (n 14) 229. 
79
 See <http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/untour/subgen.htm>, accessed 5 October 2014. Law-declaring 
resolutions of the General Assembly, for example, may assist in the determination or interpretation of 
international law or even constitute evidence of international custom. Scholars differ, however, as to whether 
 ‘ůĂǁ-ĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?of the Assembly can create law beyond their contributory role in the formation of 
ĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? &Žƌ ĚŽƵďƚƐ ? ƐĞĞ ,ĂƌƚŵƵƚ ,ŝůůŐĞŶďĞƌŐ ?  ‘ &ƌĞƐŚ >ŽŽŬ Ăƚ ^ŽĨƚ >Ăǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
European Journal of International Law 514. 
80
 As Stahn suggests that the  ? ? ? ?^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞZ ?W ŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇ  ‘ŽůĚǁŝŶĞŶĞǁďŽƚƚůĞƐ ? ? ĨŽƌ ŝƚ
does not bind the UN with new obligations, but merely restates states obligations to human rights that over 
time have already developed into positive duty through custom. See (n 19) 99 W120, esp. 102. 
81
 hE^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?  ‘WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ŝŶĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?^ ?Z^ ? ? ? ? ?  ?ƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? P
 ‘ƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵƐƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ  ? ? ?ĂŶĚ  ? ? ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ^ƵŵŵŝƚKƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ? ?hE^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽŶƚŚĞ^ƵĚĂŶ ? ?^ ?Z^ ? ? ? ? ?
(August 2006).  
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ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ŝŶĐĂƌŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶt in the sense that, in this  ‘case by case 
consideration ?, it was given legal force.  
II.C Anti-R2P Sentiments Gathering Momentum 
Notwithstanding these progressive developments, it became obvious not only that universal 
consensus over the R2P was lacking (particularly Pillar II and III obligations), but also that 
anti-R2P sentiments were bourgeoning across the UN. As ǀĂŶƐ ĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ‘>ĂƚŝŶ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ?ƌĂď ?ĂŶĚĨƌŝĐĂŶĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞhE ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŽŽŬƚŽƚŚĞĨůŽŽƌ  ?ƚŽ
ĚĞĐůĂƌĞ Q ? ƚŚĂƚthe  “World ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?82 Although the declaration 
that the GA ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ǁĂƐ  ‘Ă ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞŶŝĂů ŽĨ ĨĂĐƚ ? ? ŝƚ
demonstrated that some states wished to separate themselves from their commitment and 
were attempting to contain and diminish the impact of R2P.
83
 Although one should be 
cautious not to blow this professed hostility towards the norm out of proportion,
84
 it does 
illustrate that a number of countries wish to distance themselves from the R2P. As a result, 
this should temper those who emphasize that the R2P presents a clear constitutionalizing 
progression, since such a position understates the far more worrying fact that this emerging 
scepticism is spreading amongst some of the most ardent former R2P entrepreneurs. 
Whereas the majority of NAM countries have never been enthusiastic about the R2P, the 
support for conditional sovereignty championed by Latin American states was a major 
catalyst leading to the 2005 GA endorsement. This endorsement has now in many ways 
reversed.
85
 Similarly, Sub-Saharan countries led by South Africa, whose bold adoption of a 
pro-interventionist stance in the 2001 African Union Constitutive Act
86
 and the 2005 Summit 
are now ostensibly much less fervent about intervention and the R2P. Therefore, the fact 
that the support of former promoters of R2P has considerably waned since 2008 should not 
be ignored when considering the R2P as an emerging global constitutional norm, especially 
since these retreats have featured prominently in the R2P chronicles of the past five years 
and have had an impact on the doĐƚƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛineffective operationalization in Syria. 
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 See Evans (n 1) 52. 
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 Ibid 126. 
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 D^ĞƌƌĂŶŽ ? ‘Responsibility to Protect  W dƌƵĞŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?&ĂůƐĞŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Development Dialogue 
105. 
85
 &ŽƌĂŽƵƚůŝŶĞŽĨ>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐŚŝĨƚƐŝŶƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶZ ?W ?ŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇƌĂǌŝů ?Ɛ ?ƐĞĞD Lopes and P Vieira, 
 ‘ƌĂǌŝů ?ƐZĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ PWƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐŽƌ^ƚŝůůďŽƌŶŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐWƌŽƉŽƐĂů ? ? ? ? ?   ?
Brasiliana: Journal for Brazilian Studies  ? ? ?K^ƚƵĞŶŬĞĂŶĚDdŽƵƌŝŶŚŽ ? ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ PƌĂǌŝůĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Responsibility to Protect (2014) 14 Conflict, Security and Development 379. 
86
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé Summit (7 November 2000). 
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II.D Secretary General 2009 Report  ? Is there  ‘a change in the tide ?87 
Significant steps ŝŶ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵ ƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ are represented by its inclusion in the top five 
priorities of Ban-Ki Moon ?Ɛ 2009 General Secretary report. The report reframed the 
commitments of the 2005 World Summit ďǇ ĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƚŚƌĞĞ-ƉŝůůĂƌ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?towards 
Z ?W ?Ɛoperationalization:  ? ? ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůity to assist states to fulfil their domestic (internal) obligations; and 
 ? ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ƚŝŵĞůǇĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ ?ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? ?88 In order to appease vocal 
critiques and suspicions of previous R2P formulations, the prevailing focus of the 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŽŶƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůĞƌ
rightly notes, the new interpretation proposed by the Secretary-General aimed to bolster 
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ‘to avoid the need for military intervention [hence] distancing R2P from 
coercive ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? in order to dispel suspicions of R2P as Western imperialism.89 
Although the report deliberately downplayed the possibility for military intervention, it did 
not rule it out
90
 and even reiterated the ICISS proposition to encourage the P5 to abstain 
ĨƌŽŵĐĂƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌǀĞƚŽ  ‘ŝŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵĞĞƚŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ?91 
The report was almost unanimously endorsed in the first GA formal plenary debate on R2P, 
which reaffirmed the 2005 agreement as non-renegotiable, with only four (out of 118 states 
presenting their views) expressing strong objections to what was agreed in the 2005 
Outcome Document  W Venezuela, Sudan, Cuba and Nicaragua. Importantly, the remarks 
from India, South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria and Japan  W key regional powers, who previously 
espoused a sceptical stance towards the R2P, approved that much of the content of the 
three-pillar strategy was a prudent characterisation of the R2P.  
Although the constructive dialogue attested to widespread support for the 2009 Secretary 
GenerĂů ?Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ŝƚ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĨƵůĨŝůthe hopes of R2P proponents to reflect support for the 
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 ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐĞƚƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƚŽďĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞƉŝůůĂƌƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ PĂƚ ? ? 
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  ŚĂŶĚůĞƌ ?  ‘Z ?W Žƌ EŽƚ Z ?W ? DŽƌĞ ^ƚĂƚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? >ĞƐƐ ZƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?Global Responsibility to 
Protect 161 W166. 
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 See (n 38) 25. 
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 Ibid 27. 
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individual commitment of member states to R2P implementation and for the efforts of the 
UN to implement the R2P.
92
 In other words, efforts were focused on solidifying meta-
theoretical ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĂďŽƵƚZ ?WĂŶĚ ‘ĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐǁŚĂƚZ ?WĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚŝĚŶŽƚĞŶƚĂŝů ?ĂƐƉĞƌ 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document, rather than on obtaining 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ Z ?W ? ?93 In this sense, as Badescu ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ?  ‘ƐŝŶĐĞ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
 ? ? ? ? ? Z ?W ?Ɛ ŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ŚĂƐ ƐƚĂŐŶĂƚĞĚ ?.94 Importantly, ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ŚĞƌ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
objecƚŝŽŶƚŽZ ?WŚĂƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?ƉŽƐƚ-2009 ?,95 the fact that one of the projected outcomes 
of the debates (namely states affirming their commitment to the R2P was never fulfilled) 
makes one question the meaningfulness of rhetorical consensus and thus still raises doubts 
as to whether R2P is substantive enough to compel states to halt mass atrocity crimes in 
extremis. In this light, although representing an emerging deliberative norm, it would be an 
overstatement to also suggest that it represents an emerging global constitutional norm, 
since, as we will illustrate in later sections of this article, the R2P does not currently meet 
basic constitutionalization criteria as commonly understood, and in some ways shows 
significant signs of norm stagnation or degeneration.  
II.E R2P and a diminishing shared understanding 
The reluctance to invoke the R2P in relation to the Syrian crises, which many have identified 
ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞƉŝƚŽŵĞ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?,96 not only suggests that a shared understanding 
surrounding the R2P is thin, but also demonstrates that R2P is increasingly being perceived 
ĂƐ ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ?ďǇĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨ which are also former proponents and key 
norm entrepreneurs of the doctrine. For instance, Canada, who led international efforts to 
forge the R2P and played a pivotal role in formulating and mobilizing support prior to the 
2005 Summit, has long abandoned the R2P.
97
 This became evident in the Canadian debate 
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over Libya in which the Conservative government defied its Liberal opposition by 
intentionally avoiding the language of R2P in its attempt to justify ĂŶĂĚĂ ?Ɛ role in the Libyan 
operation. According to Nossal, the CŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞ>ŝďǇĂ
as a case of R2P constituted an effort to align with the position adopted by other Western 
governments who refrained from employing the R2P rhetoric. This wariness was also shared 
by other states in the international system, most notably China and Russia, who suggested 
that  ‘ƚŚĞZ ?WĐŽƵůĚďe used as a cover for legitimizing military intervention to achieve regime 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?98 In this way, Nossal argues that by purposely avoiding the R2P language (while not 
explicitly dismissing it), Canada allowed others to link the R2P to the Libyan case. As Nossal 
argues, this had two consequences: 1) It contributed towards the affirmation of the now 
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ>ŝďǇĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ associated with R2P ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?/n light of post-
Libyan perceptions of it being an R2P failure, has now also  ‘contributed to the increasing 
ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZ ?WĂƐĂŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŝĚĞĂ ? ?99    
Following the Libyan fiasco another former key norm entrepreneur and major regional 
power South Africa withdrew its support, followed by Brazil and India, both prominent 
powers who re-adopted their sceptical stance. The aftermath of their withdrawal was 
profoundly felt in relation to Syria, where the abstention of South Africa, Brazil and India 
added political weight to the three consecutive UNSC resolution vetoes against action in 
Syria, which were cast by Russia and China.
100
 As some have argued, with all of the BRICS 
countries now failing to provide support for the R2P, it also signals the end of the 
doctrine.
101
  
tŚĞƌĞĂƐĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞZ ?W ‘ĚĞĂĚ ? may be a step too far, what this level of dissent shows is that 
consensus surrounding the R2P norm is extremely frail, which effectively constitutes a major 
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drawback from the widely shared understanding of the 2005 World Summit and the 2009 
Secretary-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ. In this sense, the invocation of the doctrine ?Ɛ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ in Libya 
(although without making explicit reference to R2P as such) has marked a rather short-lived 
high watermark ŝŶ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ.102 What has followed is inadequate 
operationalization that has seemingly reversed any progressive trend surrounding a shared 
understanding of the R2P.  
On a more positive note, not long after the 2009 debates had concluded, on 14 September 
2009 the GA adopted by consensus its first resolution on the R2P (i.e. UNGA Res 63/308), 
with the expressed support of states who have experienced mass atrocity traumas.
103
 
Subsequently, as with the 2009 formal plenary debate, the interactive dialogues following 
the release of the 2010 and 2011 Secretary-General reports on R2P,
104
 reaffirmed that there 
is emerging meta-theoretical understanding of the norm, attested to by a near unanimity  on 
the 2005 consensus around the four mass atrocity crimes, along with the three-pillar 
strategy delineated in the Secretary-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?105 In general, all six of the Secretary-
General reports have expanded the basis for broader and stronger shared understanding. 
However, as Serrano ŶŽƚĞƐ ?  ‘ŶŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďůŝŶĚ ƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
unsettled issues and the lingering concerns ?,106 most prominently, the risk of misuse and 
selectivity, that were raised by a large number of delegations in the 2009 debate and the 
2010 dialogue. These concerns continue to generate uneasiness among UN member states 
and have even led some to readopt a sceptical stance towards the doctrine more recently, 
thus shedding doubts on the claims that the 2009 report has clearly ŵĂƌŬĞĚĂ ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
tide ?. 
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II.F Locating the Norm Stage of the R2P  
As the brief historical analysis of the R2P above suggests, determining a clear R2P norm 
trajectory remains elusive. One popular model for understanding the level of norm diffusion 
is advanced by Finnemore and Sikkink, who suggest that  ‘ŶŽƌŵƐĞǀŽůǀĞ ŝŶĂ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶĞĚlife 
cycle ?,107 comprising three key stages of norm influence and process: (i) norm emergence, 
characterized by the efforts of various norm entrepreneurs, including states, NGOs, 
individuals, to promote the new idea, followed by (ii) norm cascade (or broad acceptance) 
via norm socialisation, involving the persuasion of a critical mass of actors to endorse the 
new norm and positive precedents are gradually accumulated (iii) norm internalisation, 
ŶĂŵĞůǇ  ‘ĂĐŚŝĞǀ ?ŝŶŐ ?  ?ƚĂŬĞŶ-for-granted" quality that makes conformance with the norm 
ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ ? ďǇ ǀŝƌƚƵĞ ŽĨ Ă ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ďƌŽĂĚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ?108 In an attempt to 
provide an answer to the pivotal question of what it takes for an idea to become a norm or, 
ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƌĚ ŝƚ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ŵĂŶǇ ĂĐƚors must share [a particular] assessment 
ďĞĨŽƌĞ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĐĂůů ŝƚ Ă ŶŽƌŵ ? ? &innemore and Sikkink introduce threshold criteria, i.e. a 
 ‘ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ?, that draws the line between the first two stages. On their account, norm 
ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŚĞŶ ‘a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm ?, comprised of 
 ‘Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŽŶĞ-ƚŚŝƌĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŵŽƐƚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ  ‘critical 
states without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised ?.109 
When attempting to iŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŶƐŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝĨĞ-
cycle model, two observations become instantaneously obvious  W  ? ? Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵ
advancement substantiates (corresponds to) the key steps in the norm emergence stage and 
2) the idea has come nowŚĞƌĞŶĞĂƌĂƚƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚĂŬĞŶ-for-ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ of the third stage. 
In her interpretation of norm ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚŽĨZ ?W ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶt up to 2009, 
Badescu has argued ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ŚĂƐ ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ŝƚƐ  ‘ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ŵŽǀĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚhe 
second  ‘ĐĂƐĐĂĚŝŶŐ ?stage of norm socialisation. She bases this claim on the fact that the most 
powerful states, which participated in the negotiations prior to the 2005 Summit, 
unanimously believed in the accuracy of the R2P principles and on the subsequent 
unanimous endorsement by the 192 GA member states. When analysed to 2009, a life cycle 
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account seemingly supports ĂĚĞƐĐƵ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƚŝĚĞŚĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚ ?, but only if this 
means that formal acquiescence is neither the equivalent of enthusiastic endorsement, nor 
substantive consensus, nor a continuity in maintaining this shared understanding (as 
evidenced by increasing anti-R2P-sentiments, resulting in reluctance to invoke the norm 
when needed). 
Similarly, Serrano and Weiss argue that the R2P norm is in the early stages of its life cycle. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚǁŝƚŚĂĚĞƐĐƵ ?ƚŚĞǇĂĚŽƉƚĂŵŽƌĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůǀŝĞǁďǇĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞĂƌĞ
not quite there at the threshold of the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ? ? ?110According to Serrano and 
Weiss, despite the ǁŝĚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŽƌŵŚĂƐŐĂŝŶĞĚ ? ‘ŶŽƌŵĐĂƐĐĂĚĞŝƐĂƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŚĂƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚƐŽĨĂƌ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ?
and national institutional developments are inadequate to generate a vigorous norm 
cascĂĚĞ ? ?111 On the other hand, Welsh recently argued that the R2P norm has already 
emergĞĚĂŶĚĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽƌŵĐĂƐĐĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶ ? phase of the life cycle model.112 The 
ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚZ ?WƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐǁŚĞŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐZ ?W ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ
against the pattern of one of the most prominent models of norm diffusion suggests that it is 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions on the progress of the R2P norm. As Luck argues, 
since Z ?W  ‘ŝƐ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ůŝŶĞĂƌ Žƌ
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞƉĂƚŚƐ ? ?ŝƚ ‘ĚĞĨŝĞƐƐŝŵƉůĞŽƌĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĐ ƚĞŐŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?113 
Hence, although the life cycle model can provide crude estimations, these remain overly 
simplistic and fail to capture the more nuanced ebbs and tides involved with norm 
diffusions. This is particularly the case in relation to the history of the R2P, since the model 
does not account well for large fluctuations, drawbacks and / or norm stagnation or 
degeneration. Similarly, the model does not specify in detail how progress towards legal 
codification and constitutional grounding is advancing ǀŝĂ ‘ĐĂƐĐĂĚŝŶŐ ?or can be determined 
to have advanced ƚŽĂĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ‘ƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƐƚĂŐĞ ?. As a result, this makes the 
model better suited for normative transformations in areas where rapid norm diffusions can 
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occur, but does not account well for developments in the highly complicated political realm 
associated with the R2P. 
In an attempt to better capture the complex and dynamic forms of norm diffusion, Risse and 
^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ĂŶ ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ  ‘ƐƉŝƌĂů ŵŽĚĞů ? ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĨŝǀĞ
distinct phases: 1) repression and activation of framework; 2) denial; 3) tactical concessions; 
4) prescriptive status; and 5) rule-consistent behaviour.
114
 As a more nuanced approach, this 
model ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĞĂĐŚ ƉŚĂƐĞ
 ?ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? Q ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨ y] the causal mechanisms by which 
international norms affect ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?115  
In a further attempt to determine the status of the R2P norm, Badescu suggested that the 
ŬĞǇƐƚĞƉƐŝŶZ ?W ?ƐŶŽƌŵƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚǁŽƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ life-cycle 
model, but also met ƚŚĞƚǇƉĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐZŝƐƐĞĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ‘ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĨŝǀĞ-
ƉŚĂƐĞ  “ƐƉŝƌĂů ŵŽĚĞů ? ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵ ĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶ ĂƐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
discourse ?.116 Badescu claims that the momentum around the R2P in both academic and 
policy circles can all be brought under the umbrella of the dominant mode of social 
interaction in the second and third phases of the ƐƉŝƌĂů ŵŽĚĞů ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ  ‘ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ?.117 She further argues that the efforts to advance the R2P in the period between 
the 2005 World Summit and the July 2009 General Assembly debate, during which the 2005 
World Summit consensus was employed as a platform for the ensuing negotiations and 
compromises, fits very well within the description of the early phases of the spiral model of 
ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ  ‘ĚĞŶŝĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?118 Lastly, for Badescu, 
the July 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P further verifies that the R2P is going through 
the first two phases of the spiral model, as similarly to R2P developments prior to the 
debate,  ‘ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐƉƌŽƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐǁĂƐƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚ ? ?119 
Process-tracing of the R2P can also reveal the types of social interaction that Risse and 
Sikkink identified in their 5-phase model of norm diffusion in terms of instrumental 
                                                          
114
 See Risse and Sikkink (n 51) 21-31. 
115
 Ibid 19. 
116
 See (n 92) 114. 
See also C Badescu and T Weiss,  ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
International Studies Perspectives 359. 
117
 See (n 92) 110. 
118
 Ibid 116. See also Badescu and Weiss (n 116) 355. 
119
 See (n 92) 116. 
25 
 
adaptation and argumentative discourse. In particular, R2P developments prior to the July 
2009 General Assembly resonate with descriptions of early norm development, namely 
 ‘ĚĞŶŝĂů ? anĚ ‘ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?These two stages appear particularly relevant for potential 
misapplications of the norm as seen in the history of the R2P, since they include processes of 
adaptation, denial, dialogue, strategic bargaining, and moral conscious-raising. These stages 
are essential to contestation and its effects on norm development; and, in turn, they affect 
the course of moral persuasion, backlash, and widespread international protest.
120
 
Nevertheless, like Peters, most analytical treatments of norm diffusion within the R2P 
literature remain underdeveloped and the causal relationship between norm production, 
cascade and internalization is either assumed or receives lite-touch investigation by scholars. 
This is problematic, since under close inspection there arise a number of concerns with how 
these models conceptualize the process in which norms diffuse as well as their relationship 
with constitutionalization processes. As often argued, a key concern with norm lifecycle 
models is that they assume ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵƐƌĞƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŚroughout the diffusion 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?121 As norm diffusion relates to the R2P, a differentiated and more nuanced 
understanding is therefore important, since understandings of the norm are amalgamated, 
hijacked, pruned-down, misappropriated and interpreted in uniquely idiosyncratic ways. 
Furthermore, the R2P norm diffusion literature often assumes that there is what Betsill calls 
Ă  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ Ĩŝƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞn the global norm and the institutional contexts in which these 
norms are to be diffused.
122
 The concern here is that global norms are often seen as static 
ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƐŝŵƉůǇ  ‘Ĩŝƚ ? into existing institutional peg-holes without considerable alteration 
or lack of compliance ŽŶĐĞ ‘ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ? on paper. Again, like above, the problem here is that 
the idea of the R2P is often argued as transformative once any iteration is meta-theoretically 
agreed and that the institutions that will receive the R2P norm are empty vessels ready for it 
to eventually slot into place. As Laffey and Weldes suggest, this is too ƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ ‘ƚŚĞ
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 “Ĩŝƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉůĂƵƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽƌŶŽƚ ?ŽĨŶĞǁŝĚĞĂƐĂƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ
rather than simƉůǇ “ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?123 
The limitations of the life cycle and spiral models to capture a clear emergence level of the 
R2P are magnified in relation to the history outlined above. On one side, the R2P has been 
included in expert reports, the conclusive statement of the 2005 World Summit, 6 UN 
Secretary General Reports, 2 GA Resolutions and within twenty-six UNSC Resolutions which 
have been informed by the R2P.
124
 On the other hand, the R2P has never been incorporated 
in a treaty and its credentials as a future or potential international law norm are incredibly 
weak, given that the GA resolution adopting the concept may inform legal and political 
debates, but does not create legally binding obligations by definition. Furthermore, the past 
14 deliberative iterations associated with the R2P have significantly diluted the original 
concept, suggesting that norm diffusion is not straight-forwardly linear and has resulted in a 
norm that does not effectively fulfiů //^^ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ ƚŚĞ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐŽĨ
the humanitarian intervention norm as well as the failures associated with what was dubbed 
after the Rwanda genocide as an international authority crisis. 
Lastly, given the above, there are further arguments that could be made to suggest that the 
R2P is in fact representative of a degenerative norm. According to Panke and Petersohn, 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵ ĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ǁŚŽ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
absence of central enforcement authorities or individual states that are willing and capable 
ŽĨ ƉƵŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ŶŽƌŵ ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?125 To support this claim, Panke and Petersohn present a 
systematic study demonstrating that: 1) norms are likely to be abolished swiftly if the 
environment is unstable and rapidly changing, and if the norms are highly precise, or; 2) 
incrementally degenerated if the environment is relatively stable and if norms are 
imprecise.
126
 
In many ways the R2P substantiates the key elements in the general definition of norm 
degeŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ŚĂǀĞ
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ƉůĂǇĞĚ Ă ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ Z ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ůŝŵŝƚ ƚŚĞ
ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƐƚĂte 
concerns regarding the prospective expansion of international jurisdiction that might stem 
from the adoption of the responsibility to protect norm. More importantly, a wave of 
scepticism surrounding the norm has been on the rise as a result of its contentious 
association in Libya, the effects of which surfaced recently in rejecting the norm in Syria. 
Second, as discussed further below, there is an absence of robust enforcement of R2P 
mechanisms and a concomitant lack of willingness on behalf of individual states to punish 
norm violations. In this regard, in terms of the general definition of degenerative elements, 
the history of the R2P shows correlative properties. This does not mean that the norm is in 
fact degenerating, since it is still far too early to tell. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the 
norm is not as entrenched as many scholars argue and it offers an alternative theoretical 
treatment that leads to alternative conclusions about the long-term significance of the R2P. 
Namely, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to suggest that the R2P may be a 
 ‘ƐƚĂůůĞĚŶŽƌŵ ? ŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĂŶĚ ?ŽƌŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽ
promote it further; or that it might be degenerating, in that this inability / unwillingness to 
promote the norm essentially renders it increasingly inept and ignored by means of political 
and normative attrition.  
In relation to the two potential degenerative mechanisms outlined above, the R2P meets the 
second categorization by virtue of the fact that the environment in which the R2P has 
evolved is relatively stable. As a result, the R2P tracks well onto corresponding descriptions 
of incremental degenerative changes in the face of imprecise norms. As the historical 
analysis in this article has shown, the R2P has increasingly moved away from its 2001 
formulation, becoming more imprecise as well as less constitutionally transformative.  
Thus, given the rise of anti-R2P sentiments, a lack of clear norm status  W coupled with 
observations of norm degeneration  W it could be argued that the Syrian crisis is symptomatic 
of trends that might have prompted a process of degeneration. Naturally, only time will tell 
whether such trends will advance further or whether they are merely part of the very slow 
normative evoluƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽůůŽǁƐ ĂŶ  ‘Ğďď ĂŶĚ ĨůŽǁ ? ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
progression. However, this also means that arguments regarding the demise of the R2P 
ŶŽƌŵ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ  ‘ĐŚĞĂƉ-ƚĂůŬ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ŝŶ
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suggesting that the R2P is constitutionalizing in a meaningful way. This is because there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the R2P norm has already been weakened to the extent 
that it might be appropriate to talk about its degeneration (or at least its stagnation) and this 
resonates with the recent observations that a process of deconstitutionalization might be 
taking place at the global level.
127
 
Despite the potential of norm degeneration, by virtue of its adoption in the 2005 Outcome 
Document, we propose that it is reasonable to suggest that the R2P has generated a wide 
enough meta-theoretical understanding to be characterized as an emerging norm, yet with 
the caveat that it has been considerably circumscribed and altered from its original form and 
that its norm trajectory is far from certain. In this way, understanding the R2P as an 
 ‘ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŶŽƌŵ ?ŝƐloosely appropriate, but merely because scholars lack better terminology 
and conceptual tools and ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐwarrants further qualification as a form 
of weak emergence at best. This understanding of the R2P as a weak emerging norm also 
better aligns with ƌƵŶŶĠĞĂŶĚdŽŽƉĞ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐation of R2P as Ă ‘ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞŶŽƌŵ ? ?ǁŝƚŚ
the potential to become legally binding, but that it is still light years away from accumulating 
enough positive precedents to be considered  ‘ĐĂƐĐĂĚĞĚ ?Žƌ  ‘ƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ?.128 This also 
aligns with tĞůƐŚ ?Ɛunderstanding ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZ ?WƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŶŽƌŵ ? that continues 
to be contested both procedurally and substantively, thus rendering it more a mechanism 
for intersubjective norm deliberation than representative of a linier trajectory of progressive 
norm diffusion -  ‘ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂůůƐ ŝŶƚŽ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŵŽƌĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀist approaches to the study of 
ŶŽƌŵƐ ? ?129 As Welsh further warns, by ignoring the contestation surrounding the R2P there 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇĨŽƌŵĂŶǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐƚŽŽǀĞƌƉůĂǇĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂƐŬƐƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĚĞĞƉĞƌ
normative desire to see particular norms as univeƌƐĂůŝǌĞĚ ? ?130 In addition, labelling the R2P as 
Ă  ‘ǁĞĂŬ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ŶŽƌŵ ? ďĞƚƚĞƌ ĂůůŽǁƐ ĨŽƌ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵ ĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ
adjective  ‘ǁĞĂŬ ?signifies and better captures the fragility of the R2P and further denotes its 
lack of strength and current stagnation. What this all suggests is that the transformative 
potential of the R2P is much weaker than portrayed by strong defenders of the R2P as well 
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as by global constitutionalist scholars like Peters, who suggest ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
R2P might be also perceived as an emerging global constitutional norm.  
III. Processes of Global Constitutionalization and the R2P 
In the prior section we argued that although the R2P could be loosely interpreted as a weak 
emerging norm, the complex history of the R2P renders it difficult to make this 
determination with any firm sense of assuredness. In addition, the ambiguity of its norm 
status complicates any further claim that the R2P represents an emerging global 
constitutional norm, since the coŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞZ ?W ?ƐŶŽƌŵƐƚĂƚƵƐƌĞůĂƚĞdirectly 
to its legal adoption, compliance pull and institutional practice ĂƐĂ ŐůŽďĂů  ‘ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ? /Ŷ
order to further explore the potential relationship between the R2P and its role as an 
emerging global constitutional norm, this section will move away from the norm diffusion 
literature to focus on concepts of constitutionalization and its explanatory notions of legal 
process, subjectification and objectification as representing processes of global 
constitutionalism.
131
 
III.A R2P and Formal Legal Processes of Global Constitutionalism 
The common understanding of the concept of constitutionalization corresponds to its use as 
an explanatory tool to describe formal legal processes at the global level, where legal rights 
and duties are codified and where the authoritative mechanisms for legal adjudication 
ďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů- ŝŬĞ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?132 
In this way constitutionalization is most often used as a reference to formal and objectified 
legal arrangements and their corresponding authority mechanisms, which in comparison to 
the legal orders found within nation states, are seen to generate compliance pull, a rule of 
law and formal legal obligation.
133
 Prima facie, the R2P fits within the above conception of 
constitutionalization because we can locate an underlying formal legal process of decision-
making on the use of force, specified in the Outcome Document. That is, in 2005 the GA 
established that the decision-making power on the use of force lies exclusively with the 
UNSC. The Council has to decide as to whether a concrete event activates its jurisdiction to 
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act under Chapter VII and to determine the appropriate measures requisite to restore peace 
and security. All UNSC decisions to sanction the use of force against a sovereign state require 
UNSC member-ƐƚĂƚĞƐ  ‘ƚŽ ƐƵďŵŝƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ŽĨ Ă ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making 
process ?,134 specified under Article 27 of the UN Charter.135 The jurisdictional basis for the 
UNSC to authorise the use of force is clear (at least procedurally)  W the manifest failure of a 
state to fulfil its responsibility to protect with regards to the four mass atrocity crimes. The 
pecking order is also clear  W subsequent to a decision that there has been a manifest failing, 
the UNSC takes over the responsibility to protect from the state. In addition, some of the 
substantive elements of the R2P satisfy the criteria of legality. For instance, as Brunnée and 
Toope advocate, the legalisĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐ ĨŽƌ Z ?W ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
respŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ  “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐƌŝŵĞ ? provides for greater clarity, 
ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶĐǇŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞƐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŶŽƌŵĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?136 This 
is to say that the norm is built, at least to some extent, within the confines of the criteria of 
legality and formal processes. As a result, the above observations suggest that the R2P 
represents a prima facie constitutionalization process that mirrors formal structures of 
constitutional legal procedures.  
However, there is a critical lack of clarity with regards to the details of that legal process. It is 
unclear how the UNSC makes the decision as to whether or not compliance has been 
breached, due to the lack of definitional clarity surrounding the manifest failure 
requirement. In addition to the lack of agreed upon indicators of manifest failing, the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Ă ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐ ƚŽ  ‘ǁĂƌ ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ? ?  ‘ĞƚŚŶŝĐ
ĐůĞĂŶƐŝŶŐ ? ?  ‘ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ŽƉĞŶ ƚŽ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĞŐĂů ĂŶĚ
political interpretations. Similarly, the considerations that determine specific decisions on 
the use of force are left in the realm of politics, due to the unwillingness of the 2005 Summit 
to agree upon explicit guidelines that would require and direct use of force decisions. The 
activating approach premised upon the political assessment of what constitutes a threat or 
breach of peace and security contributes to the greater ambiguity surrounding the R2P legal 
process. Thus, a case-by-case  ‘triggering approach ? fails to meet the criteria of legality, which 
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in turn, represents an ŝŵƉĞĚŝŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƐŝŵƉĂƌƚial and consistent operationalization. 
Hence, in contrast with the claims put forward by Peters, these problematic elements of the 
Z ?WŶŽƌŵƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƚĨƵůĨŝůƚŚĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂŽĨůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ‘ŵĂǇŵĂŬĞŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ever to 
achieve the status of customary international law ?.137 Essentially, the conceptual ambiguity 
and lack of definitional certainty surrounding the R2P has resulted in a critical lack of clarity 
with regards to the legal process it institutes and thus whether it is appropriate to see the 
R2P as part of a broader constitutionalization process. 
This lack of constitutionalization is reinforced by the difficulty in establishing a strong 
relationship between the R2P and the three elements underwriting formal objectified legal 
arrangements, i.e. formal legal obligation, compliance pull and a rule of law.  
First, although the R2P specifies a positive legal obligation of states towards their citizens, 
which is anchored in international law through its link with the four atrocity crimes, it does 
not give rise to an entirely new corresponding formal legal obligation in the sense of positive 
law on behalf of the international community to act through the Security Council in the 
event of state failure. At the moment, the R2P reflects a normative requirement, not an 
obligation, which is subject to subjective interpretation, ad hoc consideration, contestation 
and the whims of reason of state.  
Second, ĚƵĞƚŽ ƚŚĞ Z ?W ?ƐǁĞĂŬĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ŝƚƐŵĞƚĂ-theoretical normative consensus 
cannot generate systematic compliance pull, where  ‘ƚŚŽƐĞƚŽǁŚŽŵit is addressed [believe] 
ŝƚŚĂƐĐŽŵĞ ŝŶƚŽďĞŝŶŐĂŶĚ ŝƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƌŝŐŚƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ
legitimate and acted upon).
138
 In this sense, if the R2P is to generate compliance, it would 
have to be in the third stage of its life-cycle, in which the norm has been internalized by state 
actors to the extent that they have taken its legality for granted and would act upon it 
automatically. As clarified before, given a lack of positive precedents, and the thin 
understanding surrounding the norm, the R2P is not there yet and thus undermines its 
constitutionalization properties. 
Third, it is particularly important to discuss the relationship between R2P and the pursuit of 
the ideal of the rule of law at the international level  W not least because paragraphs 138 and 
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139 of the Outcome Document were included under the title  ‘,ƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨ
law ? ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ, as embedded in the idea of 
constitutionalization, lends international law its formal ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ?139 The Outcome 
ŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ůŝŶŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ that the R2P was unambiguously 
envisioned to operate within the parameters of the global rule of law, commonly understood 
ŝŶƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂƐ ‘ĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐonduct of international policy ?.140 The 
precise conception of the rule of law on which the R2P is premised reflects a typical 
constitutionalist understanding that political power should be confined by a set of judicially 
protected fundamental human rights. This understanding is well-ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƐŚŽƉ ?Ɛ
definition of the principle ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ  ‘includes reliance on law as 
opposed to arbitrary power in international relations; the substitution of settlement by law 
for settlement by force; and the realisation that law can and should be used as an 
instrumentality for the cooperative international furtherance of social aims, in such fashion 
as to preserve and promote the values of freedom and human dignity for individuals ?.141 In 
this sense, in theory, the R2P contributes to fortifying the rule of law, insofar as it comes 
down to securing human rights, by explicitly propagating a view of conditional sovereignty 
under which in egregious circumstances human rights considerations trump state 
sovereignty.  
However, the goal of guaranteeing the superiority of law dictated by the international rule of 
ůĂǁ ŝĚĞĂů  ‘ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ĂŶ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ďƌŽĂĚůǇ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ
terms to the constitutional ordering of many modern states ?.142 Yet, the international legal 
system falls short of exhibiting similar institutional characteristics requisite to make it 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ? ĨƌŽŵ Ă ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? Ɛ ŽůůŝŶƐƐƵŵƐ ŝƚ ƵƉ ?  ‘ ?ŝ ?Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂŶǇ
centralised legislative body, general courts with compulsory jurisdiction, or, in the last 
measure, an efficient means of securing compliance with the law, international law appears 
constitutionally deficient ŝŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƚŽ ŝƚƐ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ ? ?143 In this sense, the 
rule of law as a whole seems to be undermined by the existing institutional framework of the 
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international legal system. This arguably presents another hurdle that needs to be overcome 
in the pursuit of greater constitutionalization at the international level and the 
constitutionalization of the R2P norm itself in the absence of adequate R2P institutions.  
This concern relates to a second prominent global constitutionalist approach in denoting 
processes of constitutionalization in international law, namely, identifying processes by 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ůĞŐĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ŚĂƐ ĞǀŽůǀed from a set of legal arrangements binding 
upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially 
enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within 
the sphere [of a mutually appůŝĞĚƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁ ? ? ?144 In relation to this understanding, Schorkopf 
ĂŶĚtĂůƚĞƌ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?Ĩ ?ƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĞƌƐpective, the process of globalisation puts 
into question the hitherto generally accepted position of constitutional law as being at the 
top of the pyramid of norms ?.145 This represents a value oriented reading of international law 
under which there is an emerging hierarchy of rules in the otherwise horizontal 
multijurisdictional international legal system.
146
 This hierarchy is determined by an emerging 
international value-system, superior to other norms of international law and premised upon 
the human rights provisions embedded in the UN Charter, the concept of jus cogens,
147
 and 
arguably the concept of erga omnes,
148
 which obtain binding force without immediate state 
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consent.
149
 dŚŝƐ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ  ‘ĐĂŶ ƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŽ ŐƵŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌ-regime 
conflicts ?.150 
In this sense, the R2P can be theoretically understood as part of the process of the 
establishment of a new constitutionalized legal order for the sake of which states will 
acquiesce to limit their sovereign rights, and the principal subjects of which include not only 
states, but also individuals. The fundamental characteristics of a constitutionalized global 
legal order that the R2P embodies and seeks to establish are the primacy of global 
constitutional law over the law of states and the effect of its provisions, which are directly 
applicable to states and their principals. Thus, in theory the R2P sets up a hierarchy of law by 
suggesting that state sovereignty can be surrendered, should states fail to meet the criteria 
of protecting their populations from mass atrocities. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the R2P in practice dampens the constitutionalist reading as it 
relates to the ideational and legal strength of sovereignty. This is because the 2005 World 
Summit largely committed states to assisting one another to fulfil their responsibility to 
protect, not just to react if they fail. The explicit wording of Pillar II as it was most recently 
published is therefore a reminder that the responsibility to protect is intended to reinforce, 
not undermine, sovereignty. In this regard, the last iteration of the R2P is not designed to 
create a hierarchical structure in which the international community imposes demands or 
solutions on states per se. Rather, it reaffirms the fundamental principle of sovereign 
equality, expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. As sovereign equals, 
states have both reciprocal rights and responsibilities to participate, as peers, in the creation 
and maintenance of international rules, norms and institutions. The responsibility to protect 
is meant to inspire cooperation among a variety of actors that are equally committed to 
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protecting populations from atrocity crimes unified prevention, and in doing so, will make 
sure that there is no need to violate state sovereignty.
151
 
III.B The R2P and Establishing and Clarifying Jurisdictional Relationships 
Constitutionalization as a descriptive tool often refers to acts of identifying legal entities that 
are not part of the process of global constitutionalization (or are in an unclear legal 
relationship) and to unequivocally bring them under the jurisdiction of the established 
constitutional legal order, which will in effect supersede prior legal relationships and that 
ultimately secures a sense of mutual legal obligation.
152
 
The 2005 Summit envisioned the existence of complementary jurisdictions in relation to the 
R2P by virtue of specifying the continued responsibility to protect of both the state and the 
international community (the two forms of R2P authority specified by the GA, where the 
primary authority lies with the former and is taken over by the latter in case of state failure). 
In this way, the R2P brings all states into a clear jurisdictional relationship with the UNSC, 
specifying that state sovereignty can be surrendered, if they manifestly fail to provide 
protection against mass atrocity crimes for their principals. Therefore, theoretically, the R2P 
is constitutionalized in the sense that it has attempted to pin down unclear jurisdictional 
relationships between the authority of the international community exercised through the 
UNSC and the authority of sovereigns. 
Nevertheless, what remains unclear is how to determine which authority has jurisdiction in a 
concrete situation where the jurisdictions of the two authorities overlap. As Orford points 
out, the Outcome Document ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ  ‘ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ
jurisdictions is to be negotiated, or according to what protocols or procedures the 
movement between jurisdictions will be conducted ?.153 For example, it is uncertain by 
whom, and how, the decision that a certain instance or action amounts to a violation of one 
of the four mass atrocity crimes is made. Relatedly, it is unclear what evidence or 
information would be required for international action. Orford puts this lack of certainty 
ĚŽǁŶ  ‘ƚŽ ĂŶ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ?
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unable to conflict with state jurisdiction, [from which follows that] there would be no need 
to elaborate procedures for moving ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?154 
Hence, similarly to the understanding of R2P as a formal legal process, there is a persistent 
lack of certainty that inhibits the subjectification of jurisdictional clarity. Although 
endeavours to clarify jurisdictional relationships bring the R2P one step closer to 
representing a constitutional meta-theoretical process, they have done so in an ambiguous 
way, which has made the trajectory of the R2P as a constitutionalizing norm unclear and 
thus rendered its jurisdictional authority inconclusive. Once again, this brings us to the 
conclusion that the R2P fits loosely within a common theoretical understanding of 
constitutionalization, but that this is ultimately too weak to also suggest that the R2P has 
moved from a weak emerging norm to a more procedurally robust and jurisdictionally 
defined emerging global constitutional norm. 
III.C The R2P and Extra-legal Processes of Norm Socialisation 
A third way constitutionalization is generally employed is as a conceptual tool to describe 
informal and extra-legal processes of norm socialisation, where norms emerge from various 
processes of legal and political interaction that act as extra-legal iterations or extra-legal 
commitments, which eventually provide the juridical basis for establishing a more 
procedurally authoritative and constitutionalized legal order.
155
 This type of socialisation is 
concerned with argumentative discourses ŝŶƚŚĞ,ĂďĞƌŵĂƐŝĂŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĞŶƚĂŝůŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
through moral discourse [with an emphasis] on processes of communication, 
argumentation, and persuasion, [by way of which] actors accept the validity and significance 
of norms in their discursive practices ?.156 
In some cases, moral discourses contest the validity of tŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛclaim, which is what 
occurred with the R2P in 2008, when certain states contested what was agreed upon in the 
2005 Summit Outcome. In other cases, moral discourses attempt to clarify whether a certain 
situation is defined correctly as a normative foundation. In this sense, although actors might 
ƐŚĂƌĞ Ă ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƐ ƚŽ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Ă
particular behaviour or action is covered by it might differ. Such discursive practices gained 
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prominence shortly after the 2005 World Summit. This period was characterised by an 
intensification of political discourse, attested by the invocations of the R2P on three occasion 
in 2008: 1) in an attempt to facilitate diplomatic consensus preventing mass atrocities in 
Kenya, 2) by France in the context of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe caused by 
cyclone Nargis in Burma and 3) by Russia to justify its military incursion in Georgia. Whether 
appropriately invoked or not, these R2P references constituted a major contribution to a 
socialisation process for they helped to clarify both what the norm should and should not 
ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐ ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? Z ?W ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
constructive dialogues that followed them presented the opportunity for argumentative 
discourses to advance, which in turn haƐůĞĚƚŽƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞZ ?W ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞevolution by 
virtue of enhancing its theoretical clarity. More recently the failure of R2P action in Syria 
raised important questions with regards to the definition of the manifest failure concept, 
which, if addressed adequately, will lead to the further clarification of the R2P norm. In this 
sense, even when the R2P is not being invoked it can potentially lead to enhancing a shared 
understanding.  
On balance, the various R2P iterations have helped to attain normative clarity and thus 
represent processes of global constitutionalization and intersubjective communicative action 
in the Habermasian sense. Nonetheless, although these deliberative processes can move the 
constitutionalist agenda forward, as argued in Section Two, they have not socialized actors 
into norm-complying practices (i.e. to internalise them), which would occur only when actors 
ĂďŝĚĞ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ  ‘ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?.157 Relatedly, 
various iterations with different legal weight are not sufficient to generate custom in 
international law.  The most commonly cited definition of customary international law, 
found in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, states that 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐƵƐƚŽŵ ? ĂƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ Ăccepted as law, is one of the 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ?158 As traditionally understood, customary international law is 
premised upon two elements: 1) state practice (an objective requirement pertaining to state 
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behaviour); and 2) opinio juris  ?Ă ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ subjective belief that a rule of international law 
binds them).
159
 
To conclude, in contrast with the previous two representations of constitutionalization, the 
R2P substantiates a customary understanding of this process and a weak emerging norm in 
terms of discourse around an idea of R2P. However, it is unlikely that the ultimate goal of 
formal norm constitutionalization can be attained solely through accumulating various R2P 
portrayals in international discourse, for despite the fact that the latter helps to propel the 
norm further on its normative track, it alone ĐĂŶŶŽƚůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƐĨŽƌŵĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂtion 
into legal covenants. This is not to say that through continued intersubjective discourse the 
R2P may ultimately result in a broad normative shift where the R2P is more formally 
constitutionalized. This is only to say that, at the moment, the socialization of R2P remains 
epistemically uncertain and therefore understanding the R2P as a process of emerging 
constitutionalization via socialization is in many ways hopeful thinking in the midst of 
divergent pathway dependencies and potential alternative outcomes.  
Conclusion: Stalled Constitutionalism and the Potential Degeneration of the R2P Norm? 
The aim of this article has been to systematically investigate the normative evolution of the 
R2P and to determine its relationship with global constitutionalization as well as to explore 
its wider implication with regards to global constitutionalism. In doing so, we have argued 
that although the R2P can at best be reasonably labelled as a weak emerging norm, it at 
present systematically fails to meet the more demanding signifiers of an emerging 
constitutional norm.  
Nevertheless, when investigating this relationship questions also arise about whether the 
R2P displays the hallmarks of what might be labelled as a stalled or degenerating norm. 
These concerns become particularly germane to current debates about the significance of 
the R2P, since advocates of the R2P often claim that it has surpassed its norm predecessor 
humanitarian intervention in terms of both normative advancement and political influence. 
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To reiterate the words of ĞůůĂŵǇ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŶŽǁ ĂƌĞ ŽŶĞƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ŚŽǁ ďĞƐƚƚŽ
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚZ ?W ?ŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?160 
However ?ĞůůĂŵǇ ?Ɛ more ŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞZ ?W ?ƐŶŽƌŵƐƚĂƚƵƐseemingly fails to fully 
appreciate the relationship between theory and practice, and what practice tells us about 
how a normative principle might reach some level of acceptance (emergence), while at the 
same time receiving increased contestation and/or stagnation in terms of policy application 
and effectiveness (stalled or degenerating). In other words, key political actors might 
understand the R2P as a concept that has potential relevance to current phenomenon, but 
this does not also mean that it is held as normatively imperative as an action guiding 
principle. An analogy could be made with the Genocide Convention, in that there has been 
broad acceptance that genocide represents a humanitarian  ‘ĐƌŝŵĞŽĨĐƌŝŵĞƐ ? ?yet this has not 
translated into action to prevent Srebrenica, Rwanda or Darfur. Scholars like Gallagher argue 
that this failure is due to the fact that there is still no agreement on the exact definition of 
genocide, or when mass atrocities represent genocide, or agreement about when action is 
required.
161
 Although the Genocide Convention enjoys greater constitutionalization in terms 
of its status as international law, with more applied practice in post-conflict prosecutions, it 
has nonetheless remained inert as a prevention norm.
162
 This suggests that it is possible for a 
norm to be deeply entrenched within the political lexicon while at the same time, in 
practice, constitutionally stalled.  
This understanding for the potentiality of stalled or degenerating norms fits with Antje 
WieŶĞƌ ?Ɛconstructivist account, which highlights that public endorsement of a norm in an 
international statement or agreement can lead to renewed arguments about the desirability 
and scope of the norm, therefore affecting the willingness of norm followers to embrace 
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implementation. As Wiener ?Ɛmore thorough analysis illustrated, in some cases, this can lead 
to backsliding or differential interpretations of the norms meaning.
163
  
In this way, one particular area where the R2P does not signal clear progress is in relation to 
a continued sense of frustration about the constitutional deficiency and inferior institutional 
structure of international politics and law, which finds a prominent expression in both global 
constitutionalism as well as within much of the humanitarian intervention and R2P 
literature. In many ways Lang gets to the heart of this persistent problem when he argues 
that the core problem with the Kosovo intervention was  ‘ƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬŽĨĂ ƚƌƵůǇ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽƌĚĞƌ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ůĞǀĞů ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
conflicting sets of rules [on human rights and sovereignty] ?.164 In his discussion of the 
different elements of a global constitutional order, and their impact on norm compliance, 
Lang suggests that although international bodies played a prominent role in the Kosovo 
intervention - namely ƚŚĞ K^ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ
abuses and the hE^ ?Ɛ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ƌŽůĞ ƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?  ?hE^
Resolution 1244) - when it came to providing ĂũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŽ ‘ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƚŽĨĨĂĐƚƐĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐ
were to be applied in this particular situation, no judicial structure was invoked or even tried 
to play a role ?.165 Although some have suggested that the UNSC played the role of a judiciary 
in this situation, had it acted, one institution would be performing both the roles of a 
judiciary and an executive, which is often held to be a dangerous absence of checks and 
balances by constitutionalists as well as by political scientists more broadly.
166
 Furthermore, 
it appeared that the function of the institution that is best fit to make such a judgment, as 
the closest approximation to a constitutional court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
was compromised by its extremely slow procedural process, which would have made it 
impossible to decide on a humanitarian emergency case in a timely fashion, even if it had 
been engaged.
167
 Hence, Lang suggests that in order to overcome the deficiencies of 
humanitarian intervention institutions we need to establish something more like a 
constitutional order at the global level. For Lang,  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂŽĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ
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the importance of judgements undertaken by a global judiciary in accordance with a broadly 
understood rule-governed system ?.168 Such judgements may necessitate interpretations (of 
existing rules) by judicial bodies that can articulate a vision as to when intervention is 
permissible.
169
  
Given the problems above it is not surprising that a lack of sufficient institutional capacity 
has also often been dubbed as one of the utmost problems obstructiŶŐ Z ?W ?Ɛ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ
operationalization. Most prominently, Evans identifies the lack of  ‘institutional 
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐ ? as one of the three key challenges of the R2P, namely the capacity for 
conceptual, institutional and political action.
170
 In a nutshell, the conceptual challenge, 
discussed in the previous section, lies in having greater definitional clarity of the R2P 
concept; the institutional challenge  W in  ‘establishing the necessary structures and 
mechanisms to ensure governments and international organisations follow appropriate 
processes when dealing with potential R2P situations ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů  W in generating the 
necessary political will to instigate UNSC (and regional organizations) action in R2P scenarios 
consistently.
171
 This enduring lack of institutional capacity reflects the analysis of the R2P 
norm put forward by Welsh, who argues that on-going contestations regarding both the 
substantive and procedural aspects of R2P strongly remain, rendering it institutionally 
 ‘ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ?thus making enthusiastic predictions about the R2P ?Ɛ norm trajectory either 
highly speculative and/or based on wishful thinking.
172
   
In addition, since the unresolved institutional challenges of humanitarian intervention have 
ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇĐŽŵĞƚŽŚĂƵŶƚŝƚƐZ ?WƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵ>ĂŶŐ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ
the failings of the Kosovo intervention not only speak to institutional issues as to whether 
the R2P should be labelled a global constitutional norm, but apply equally to discussions 
about whether or not the R2P can be considered to have effectively surpassed its norm 
predecessor humanitarian intervention. As we have suggested, making such a claim is highly 
problematic given existing contestations, gaps between global constitutional principles, 
indeterminate processes of constitutionalization, and analogous stagnations associated with 
institutional practice. Although Bellamy and others have argued that the R2P norm should 
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not be considered  ‘dead ? because no key player has formally rejected it, using this criteria as 
a yardstick alone is problematic, since it seemingly does not allow for the possibility that the 
R2P might be  ‘effectively dead ? in terms of stalled constitutionalization and/or potential 
norm degeneration through inertia.  
GŝǀĞŶƚŚĞďƵƌŐĞŽŶŝŶŐĐůĂŝŵƐŽĨZ ?W ?ƐĚĞŵŝƐĞƐŝŶĐĞ ? ?12, the lack of any robust endeavour to 
put such claims of degeneration to the test is surprising. If the R2P is beyond stalling, and is 
in fact  ‘ĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ? ? ĂƐ ƐŽŵĞ ŚĂǀĞsuggested, then it is important to investigate this 
phenomenon in more detail then we have done here and to better appraise any downward 
trends ƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ŝŶZ ?W ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵ trajectory. Looking at this in more detail will 
suggest important implications in regards to understanding the R2P as part of global 
constitutionalization. Namely, if a process of R2P degeneration is currently at work, 
discussing the R2P as transformative, either constitutionally or otherwise, becomes even 
more suspect.  
 
